BDSM case goes to the Supreme Court

cross-posted from hunter of justice

The US Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a case involving the seemingly technical but highly important question of when a criminal conviction can be overturned based on the possibility that it was based on conduct that occurred before any law made it illegal. While the case is already generating headlines, you are not likely to hear a great deal about the Ex Post Facto Clause issue at the heart of the appeal. Instead, media coverage has and presumably will continue to focus on the involvement of both the defendant and the complainant in the case in the BDSM subculture.

The prosecution and conviction in United States v. Marcus shocked many people, not least members of the BDSM (bondage/discipline, domination/submission, and sadomasochism) community, who alternately condemned the defendant for violating the moral standards of the community and worried that they too could be at risk. Glenn Marcus and the woman identified in court records only as Jodi met in 1998 and began what the prosecution conceded was initially a consensual “Master/slave” relationship. A year later, however (the State contended), the relationship became non-consensual because of Marcus’s cruelty and threats, and Jodi was blackmailed into remaining in the relationship by his threats of showing explicit photos of their activities to Jodi’s family. Marcus’s defense vigorously contested the charges, which turned on Jodi’s testimony that she withdrew her consent and only continued the relationship out of fear. Marcus was convicted of forced labor and sex trafficking under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, based on Marcus’s sexual and BDSM activities with Jodi and on forcing Jodi to work on maintaining his BDSM website.

The Second Circuit overturned Marcus’s convictions, saying that because the government built its case largely on events that occurred before the TVPA’s enactment, and the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the matter, it was at least possible that the verdict was based conduct that was not a federal crime when it occurred. (Notably, then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the relevant circuit precedents were at odds with Supreme Court precedent. Sotomayor has now recused herself from the case.) Accordingly, Marcus was entitled to a new trial, focusing exclusively on whether Marcus coerced and abused Jodi in late 2000 and 2001. The Supreme Court will now decide whether a conviction can be reversed based only on a possibility, as opposed to a likelihood, that it was based on pre-enactment conduct, and thus whether the new trial will proceed. Although it is the Court’s job to focus on the specific legal questions presented to it, some members of the Court will likely be unable to resist delving into the morality and legality of BDSM. The legal arguments and media coverage of the case, therefore, should be digested with the following in mind:

Marcus’s conviction turned on the question of consent. Marcus’s defense has contended throughout that he has been imprisoned for consensual BDSM activities, and that Jodi, on whose testimony the whole case hinged, brought a false case to prosecutors, long after the fact, because of a dispute over pictures of her on Marcus’s website. By contrast, the prosecution contended that this was a case about a relationship that began consensually but turned into something different and criminal. At the urging of the defense, the court’s jury instructions specified that the terms “physical restraint,” “threats of serious harm,” “force” and “coercion” in the federal statute must be interpreted so as to exclude consensual BDSM conduct. 487 F.Supp.2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). While the very idea of consensual BDSM, and the distinction between a consensual “Master/slave” relationship and actual captivity and abuse, may have been difficult for jurors to comprehend, the jury convicted Marcus in light of these instructions and the trial court found the evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict in light of this interpretation of the law. Marcus has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, and accordingly the factual question of consent is now closed, as far as the courts are concerned.

The most sensationalized facts of the case actually involved consensual activity. Jury instructions notwithstanding, the prosecution and the press certainly capitalized on every available detail to paint a picture of a depraved abuser. In particular, press accounts emphasized that Marcus whipped Jodi, cut the word “slave” onto her stomach with a knife, shaved her head and branded her with his initial. However, Jodi testified and the government conceded that these activities were consensual, occurring before she moved to Maryland to be closer to Marcus and months before she became afraid and wanted to leave him. While cutting and branding may seem extreme to some, there is nothing inherently abusive about these activities. What shows Marcus to be an abuser and a criminal, if that is what he is, is not the physical things he did but that did them through force and coercion rather than mutual consent.

From the start, Marcus crossed lines within the BDSM community. Though Marcus has been publicly defended by personal friends in the BDSM community, the community as a whole has been ambivalent toward the case. Marcus’s approach to M/s relationships, as detailed in the trial record, included notions of “consensual non-consent” and “no-limits submission” that are controversial within the community. That is, Marcus made it known that once a woman had committed to his service, he would ignore her objections to specific activities or requests to leave. According to the trial record, Marcus used threats of blackmail to manipulate Jodi, and at one point instructed Jodi to entice her sister to visit and to drug her so Marcus could rape her (she refused). Some community members have suggested that the Marcus case may illustrate the legal boundaries of responsible BDSM, with “safe, sane and consensual” BDSM clearly protected by the law, and practitioners of “consensual non-consent” acting at their own risk.

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in United States v. Marcus (case no. 08-1341) early next year.

Not a crime to show dirty pictures of onself to a teen old enough to consent to sex

The usual Creep Caveat applies to this post.

Here's another case dealing with exhibiting harmful matter to a minor. In Salter v. State, 2009 WL 1409484 , the Indiana Court of Appeals overturned such a conviction on the ground that the statute was vague as applied to pictures sent over the Internet to a young woman of 16. The court reasoned that since the state set the age of sexual consent at 16, the "harmful matter" statute failed to provide clear notice to the defendant that he could legally have sex with the woman but could not legally send her pictures of his erect penis.

We understand Salter's argument to be that he had no way of knowing that pictures of his genitals would be considered “harmful” to M.B., given that, under Indiana law, he could have been naked in front of M.B. and had sex with her without violating any law. Again, we must agree.

...By setting the legal age of consent at sixteen, the Indiana legislature has made an implied policy choice that in-person viewing of another person's genitals is “suitable matter” for a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old child. That being so, how could Salter have known that a picture of his genitals would be “harmful,” that is, not “suitable,” for M.B.? Asked another way, if such images are harmful to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old children, then why would our legislature allow those children to view the same matter in-person, in the course of sexual activity?

One judge dissented, noting that the defendant didn't have a sexual relationship with the young woman involved, and that the harmful matter statute did not depend on a minor's consent. But given that the young woman here sent the defendant semi-nude pictures of herself as well, it seems fair to say that there was some kind of consensual sexual relationship here, albeit an online one. It would be truly bizarre if it were legal for two people of whatever age to have sex, but illegal for them to have cybersex. I am aware, however, that in the eyes of many people over 35, anything involving the Internet is automatically twice as dangerous.

(N.B. - the court's opinion makes no mention of the defendant's age.)

Though originally nabbed because of this online relationship with a teenager, Mr. Salter was also charged with something even more unsavory: possession of child pornography. This included not just the pictures of the 16-year-old created and sent by her, but also pictures of unknown, younger children apparently obtained from the Internet. Mr. Salter was clearly liable for possession of the latter (but not the former, because Indiana sets the age for defining child pornography at the age of sexual consent, 16). But the prosecutor decided to go for a bigger sentence by charging him with creating child pornography, on the basis of his downloading the images and burning them to CD. The court (again 2-1) following the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court (State v. Sisler) in concluding that simply copying preexisting digital images does not fall within the ambit of a statute targeted at the actual production of child pornography. The court reasoned that copying a digital images is analogous to simple possession, not to creating a new image.

The court therefore reversed these convictions as well. It noted that the state could not prosecute Salter for simple possession as to the images of the 16 year old regardless, and might have screwed itself out of charging him with possession of the other images because of the state's Successive Prosecution Statute. Which hopefully will teach that prosecutor a lesson.

Craigslist bows to states' pressure, axes "Erotic Services"

This week Craigslist announced that, pursuant to a deal with several state attorneys general, it will be eliminating its "Erotic Services" section. The news media have framed the pressure on Craigslist as a response to recent crimes against people who used the site. Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, who spearheaded the effort, has pitched his campaign alternately as aimed at preventing trafficking and child exploitation, and as a plain morals campaign against "pornography, nudity, and open offers of sex for money." Craigslist initially vowed to require posters on Erotic Services to enter credit card information, but the state officials wouldn't settle for that, so the site is no replacing the section with a new "Adult" section, in which each post will be pre-screened by Craigslist employees.

A coalition of organizations advocating for sex workers released this statement:

With Craigslist’s recent announcement that its Erotic Services category will be discontinued within the week, hundreds of thousands of erotic service providers will become more vulnerable to dangerous predators. Eliminating erotic listings as Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and others propose will only drive us further underground.

Policing the masseuses, phone workers, pro-dominants, and escorts using Craigslist fails to protect those of us who are coerced into the sex industry. Preventing the use of Craigslist advertisements also eliminates the advantage of screening clients online, which makes for a safer work experience by filtering out potentially dangerous individuals. Furthermore, keeping us offline hinders police investigations of violent crime. In the Boston murder of Julissa Brisman, it was online tracking that enabled the police to identify the suspect. One has to wonder: are the Attorneys General examining the evidence or simply enforcing their moral values?

“Removing the erotic services category from Craigslist does not help prevent violence against escorts and other sex workers. It only pushes me and people like me out of the places where advertising is available,” said Jessica Bloom, a sex worker from Sex Workers Action New York (SWANK). In the face of increasing criminalization, we insist upon respect. As mothers, daughters, brothers, and members of your community, we claim that sex work is real work, work that we are entitled to conduct in safety. As such, we must be accorded the human right of full protection under the law.

Sex work activist Miss Calico has this to say about the move:

It’s true that Craigslist is a major advertising venue, for prostitutes but also sex workers of all kinds: the largest in the nation. Its loss will have a distinct effect on the people who use it. Here’s how it works: we advertise to attract the clients we want, and screen to eliminate the clients we don’t, but the number of clients we need stays the same. Anything that hurts our methods of attracting clients, like the shutdown of Erotic Services, will affect how stringent our screening can afford to be. It’s pretty clear to me that Craigslist has just made its sex workers more marginalized and more at risk.

Now, Craigslist has no responsibility to provide an advertising venue. But if Attorney General Richard Blumenthal is trying to make sex workers safer, he’s going about it all wrong. He doesn’t need to protect us from ourselves, or from our clients. He needs to protect us from criminals.

At the Sex 2.0 conference this past weekend, Melissa Gira analogized the panic over Craigslist to New York City's "cleanup" of Times Square. Both spaces came to represent the threat of sexual corruption encroaching on "normal," "decent" places. Targeting these spaces allowed politicians to simultaneously appear to be both protecting moral purity and addressing real social problems of crime, etc., without really addressing those problems at all. As Miss Calico points out, sex work isn't going away, and the short term effects of driving online sex work advertising "underground" -- at least until some other site replicates the efficiency, anonymity and ubiquity of Craigslist -- could be harmful both for sex workers and for law enforcement.

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As a side note, none of the news reports or press releases indicate what kind of legal claims the state governments might have had against Craigslist. I've previously mentioned the question of federal immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act with regard to a still-pending public-nuisance suit targeting "Erotic Services." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in an egegrious case of revenge porn, that Yahoo! might have lost its 230 immunity only because its staff specifically promised the plaintiff to take the offending material down.

UPDATE: Here's some further analysis of Craigslist's likely legal defense under CDA from the Electronic Frontier Foundation. (More, too, from the Citizens Media Law Project which notes the site's previous efforts to ensure Erotic Services isn't use to exploit children.) Of course, settlements like this are based not only on likelihood of success but on business decisions about public relations and litigation costs. They have previously won litigation over discriminatory preferences in their housing ads, but that doesn't mean they're eager to go through the process again. Ditching Erotic Services was clearly more desirable for Craigslist than fighting several state governments in court and in the media.

Gender, "deception" and the law, pt. 3

This is the third post in a series inspired by the Angie Zapata murder trial in Colorado, and in particularly by the suggestion by some people that transgender people who are victims of hate crimes by sexual partners were themselves guilty of "deception." In the first post, I sketched out the traditional narrow legal interpretation of the kind of deception that can vitiate sexual consent. In the second post, I explored possible extensions of this concept and argued against them. This post specifically considers the question of disclosure by transgender people of their sexual anatomy and/or gender history to sexual partners.

Actual gender "deception" cases. A recent article by an Israeli law professor identified five cases internationally in which transgender individuals have been prosecuted for failing to disclose their gender history to sexual partners: two cases in the U.S., one in the U.K., and two in Israel. See Aeyal Gross, Gender Outlaws Before the Law: The Courts of the Borderland, 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 165 (2009).

• In the United Kingdom in 1991, Jimmy Saunders was charged with indecent assault on the basis that he concealed the fact that he was born female from two sexual partners. He was convicted, though the Court of Appeals reduced his sentence.
  
• In Colorado in 1995 - the same state where the Zapata murder took place - Sean O'Neill was charged with false impersonation and sexual assault on the basis that he concealed the fact that he was born female from four sexual partners. He plead guilty to lesser charges.
• In 1997 in Washington state, Christopher Wheatley was charged with sexual assault on the basis that he concealed the fact that he was born female from two sexual partners. He plead guilty.
• In Haifa, Israel in 2003, Hen Alkobi was charged with sexual assault and "impersonation of another person" on the basis that he concealed the fact that he was born female from four sexual partners. He plead guilty to the sexual assault charge, contested the impersonation charge, and was convicted on both charges.
• In 2007, another transgender man in Israel was charged with statutory rape as well as "indecedent acts" on the basis that he fraudulently obtained consent from a sexual partner by concealing the fact that he was born female. (My only source for this case is Gross, who does not give a name and says the case was ongoing as of early this year.)

I would be very interested to find out more about these cases than is available in readily-accessible, English-language sources, particularly the U.K. and recent Israeli cases.

Notably, all of these cases involved male-identified transgender persons who had sexual relationships with underage women (and in all but one case, with multiple underage partners). It thus appears that it is peculiarly trans men who partner with women who are in danger of being prosecuted for dating without disclosing (whereas women who partner with men are in more danger of being killed by their partners). Additionally, each of these cases apparently could have been prosecuted solely on charges of statutory rape. Thus, these are not cases of individuals being singled out for prosecution based on failure to disclose, but rather cases that would have been prosecuted regardless based on the involvement of minors - though it is clear that prosecutors and/or judges in these cases did have particular reactions of disgust to these gender-variant defendants, and to their involvement of seemingly unwitting young women in what these authorities no doubt regarded as homosexuality.

As far as I can tell, in only one of these cases -- the U.K. case -- did a court rule that failure to disclose one's anatomy or gender history vitiates consent and creates liability for sexual assault. In the other cases, it appears the defendants simply decided to strike a deal, which made sense given that they were probably liable for statutory rape regardless. The latter cases provide no support for the legal theory that these circumstances negate consent. Even in the Saunders case, it's not clear from secondary sources to what extent this aspect of the prosecution was challenged, or even if the assault convictions themselves (rather than just the sentence) were appealed.

U.K. law today. In 2000, the Law Commission of the United Kingdom specifically recommended that the U.K. Sex Offences Act not be interpreted to treat a failure to disclose transgender status as deception that vitiates consent. The Commission reasoned that this would amount to "the creation of a special rule for transsexuals," and accordingly would likely violate the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits discrimination against trans people and guarantees the right to expression and recognition of a person's gender identity. (While the Commission stated this recommendation only in terms of individuals who had undergone sex reassignment surgery, it would probably take a different view now that, under the Gender Recognition Act, the U.K. permits change of legal gender in the absence of surgery.)

Regardless, in 2003 the U.K. revised its sexual offenses law, and narrowed the language concerning deception. Following the traditional approach of American courts, the current language covers only situations of deception about "the nature or purpose of the relevant act" or "impersonating a person known personally to the complainant." Thus, regardless of the Saunders case, it appears that UK law today would not treat failure to disclose anatomy or gender history as rape or indecent assault.

Trans people are not liars. Consider why a transgender person would hesitate disclose their sexual anatomy or gender history to an actual or potential sexual partner. Trans people are not sexual predators looking for unsuspecting victims. They live in a society where their gender identity and expression are not accepted as authentic by many, perhaps most people around them - indeed, where that identity and expression are viewed as mere pretense. They live in a society where fear and loathing of gender variance and homosexuality are intense. These fears are linked by failure to understand or accept trans identities, and manifest most strongly as fears of sexual pollution. These facts are particularly salient for trans people who are young, are just beginning or have recently made a gender transition, and who live in rural or socially conservative areas. Add to this the psychic distress, embarassment and extreme shyness many trans people experience regarding aspects of their sexual anatomy and gender history. Being rejected by a partner who does not accept their gender identity is a painful prospect - as is seeking out partners who will desire them precisely because of not accepting their gender identity.

Given this context, disclosure to potential partners is fraught on all sides for many trans people. The partner who will both accept their identity and still desire them will be rare - depending on geography and other factors, perhaps very rare. At the same time, by not disclosing they are not lying: they are simply living their lives and presenting their authentic gender, as they do in other social relationships. And once an interpersonal connection exists, the prospect of coming out can be frightening, and appear very much easier to postpone or avoid.

Trans people are no more liars when they do not disclose these matters to potential partners than they are liars by simply living their lives. This is who they are. Of course, in a long-term relationship, tiptoeing around the personal details will be difficult and probably unhealthy for the relationship. For this reason, and in response to very real fears of violence, trans people usually do disclose to sexual partners, especially when looking for a lasting romantic relationship. While I have little sympathey for other people's anxieties about being sexually polluted by a sexual partner with the "wrong" body parts, it's never desirable to risk distress to others. But I find it difficult to judge morally, and repulsive to punish criminally, the choice of some individuals, particularly in casual encounters or at the beginning of a relationship, not to come out.

Gender, "deception" and the law, pt. 1

Last week, a Colorado jury sentenced Allen Andrade to life in prison for the brutal murder of 18-year-old Angie Zapata. The jury rejected Andrade's attempt to mitigate his crime by arguing he was provoked into a crime of passion following the discovery that Zapata, with whom he'd had a sexual encounter, was a transgender woman. Queer and transgender blogs covered the story of the trial quite thoroughly (I've mentioned it previously too), and I won't recount all that here. Suffice to say that whatever my usual qualms about our criminal justice system, the Zapata verdict was reassuring in its rejection of the desperate but nonetheless vile victim-blaming defense strategy. Still, a number of commentators have predictably placed the blame on Zapata for her own gruesome death by condemning her supposed "deception" about her gender history. (The local paper covering the trial even ran the headline "Andrade: Stunned Victim or homophobe?") Some have gone so far as to suggest that such "deception" of a sexual partner could constitute criminal sexual assault.

The suggestion that transgender people who fail to disclose their gender history to sexual partners are themselves perpetrators of sexual violence owes more to horror of transgender people themselves, and of perceived "homosexual" acts, than to legal interpretation. Yes, many rape and sexual assault statutes state that deception vitiates consent. But the inherently malleable concept of deception has rightly been narrowly interpreted by courts. In this and a subsequent post I hope to sketch out some of the how and why of that interpretation, and why extending it to situations like the Zapata case would be legally untenable and morally unacceptable.

American and British courts have interpreted the concept of deception in rape and sexual assault statutes narrowly, to account for a few obvious situations in which the defendant's conduct obviously vitiates consent and fits within, or closely resembles, the common law concept of battery. See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 Buffalo Crim. L. Rev. 317, 457-75 (2000). This is a sensible approach, given how malleable and potentially limitless the concept of deception is.

Nature of the act. Courts have regularly said that fraud concerning the "nature of the act" vitiates consent, but by that they mean something very specific: the defendant causes the victim to believe that an otherwise unwanted sexual contact is something else entirely. The classic examples are medical professionals purporting to conduct a clinical examination or deliver a medical treatment.

Mistaken identity. Courts have also recognized identity fraud as vitiating consent, and this also means something very specific: the defendant causes the victim to believe that the defendant is actually some other person altogether. The classic example is the defendant posing as a person's spouse.

Infection, fertility and common-law battery. Several states now criminalize exposure of unwitting sexual partners to a sexually transmitted disease, but this is not classified as a species of rape. Rather, it is considered akin to common-law battery; liability is based not on whether the sexual partner would have consented given certain information, but rather on the potential physical injury. One could also imagine liability for lying about having had a vasectomy, but in this scenario, too, liability would be based not on the notion that consent to sex was vitiated as such, but that the victim would probably have insisted on using contraception. It was not the sex that was unwanted, but the consequences. These statutes are controversial, of course, both as a matter of justice and of public health.

In a follow-up post I intend to sketch the debate over extending the deception concept to other scenarios, and argue that doing so is unwise; and to discuss briefly the handful of cases in which transgender people have been prosecuted for "deception" of sexual partners.

Surfing cable is not "exhibiting harmful matter to a minor"

The California Court of Appeals recently overturned a conviction for "exhibiting harmful material to a minor," also known as "showing kids dirty pictures." The court ruled that there was insufficient evidence that the television segments involved fit the statutory definition.

Cable is not a crime. Shaun Martin at the California Appellate Report has this assessment of the case:

(1) As a preliminary matter, it's not okay to touch a 16-year old sophomore. Particularly when she's the friend of your daughter. I think David Dyke knows that now, and knew it then as well. So if you're convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery (as David was here in Count II), that's fair.

(2) More relevant to this appeal, however -- and to most of us law-abiding citizens as well-- it's not illegal to be flipping through channels on the television and stumble across an NBC, HBO, or (even) Cinimax program. Even if a 16-year old is present. And even if you (allegedly) linger on a fake sex scene -- e.g., your typical broadcast "waist up, lots of grunting" shot) longer than you should given the audience. That's what's on television nowadays. It's not obscene. And it does not count as illegally "exhibiting harmful material to a minor," for which David was convicted in Count One. Watching regular television simply isn't a crime. Even if it's "Leaving Las Vegas," "American Beauty," or (to your eternal regret) "Showgirls"....

The court noted that there was no way to tell from the sketchy descriptions of the TV segments involved whether, under the terms of the statute, the allegedly "harmful matter" lacked "serious value":

Was the dance by the unclothed female lurid, artistic, or even a cultural or tribal dance? There is no way to know and no reasonable basis for inferring that it lacked such value. As to the 45-second glimpse of the couple presumably having sexual intercourse, was the clip part of a tawdry adult film, a former Academy Award winner being shown on television that night, or even a brief scene from Shakespeare‘s Romeo and Juliet.

Should "exhibiting harmful matter to a minor" be criminal? Although overturning the conviction in this case, the appeals panel made clear that they saw no constitutional or policy problem with the law, and in fact, went out of their way to suggest that the law could and should be drafted more broadly, so as to capture cases like this one. Specifically, they noted that the legislature had narrowed the definition of "harmful matter" in 1988 so that it essentially tracked the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity. The judges suggested, though, that the First Amendment does not require a statute like this to be so narrow, because the statute also required that the exhibiting must be done "with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of that person or of a minor, and with the intent or for the purpose of seducing a minor." The court said this was a case of "mixed speech and expression," and so it would be permissible to reach a broader category of otherwise-protected speech. The court said it "would encourage the Legislature to revisit this issue, given the potential consequences of so narrowly defining harmful matter when it is used to groom young victims for acts of molestation."

I understand the rationale here: it is not the mere exposure of minors to racy material that is punished, but the use of the material to facilitate abuse. But I'm not sure whether it is either necessary or wise as a matter of policy. Not sure whether it's necessary, because there are any number of other things a person might do to "groom young victims for acts of molestation" other than show them pornography -- engage in sexual talk with them, for example, or give them alcohol, or do any number of other things to curry affection and normalize inappropriate intimacy -- and we don't separately criminalize them. Not sure whether it's wise, because the intent factor fails to set clear, objective boundaries on when prosecution is appropriate. Public screenings are clearly exempted, but in any one-on-one interaction there exists the possibility of unintended but untoward appearances. It is at least reassuring, however, that the California Court of Appeals has previously interpreted this law to require a specific intent to entice the minor into physical sexual contact with the defendant, as opposed to encouraging the minor to, e.g., masturbate alone. People v. Jensen, 114 Cal.App. 4th 224 (App. 6 Dist. 2003).

Who cares? Prof. Shaun had these closing thoughts on People v. Dyke:

The fact that the trial court let this count go forward, and that the jury convicted on it, says some pretty damning stuff about the judicial system here. I get the keen sense that this happens not because of some neutral assessment of whether it's in fact illegal to watch television alongside a 16-year old, but rather because we don't like what the defendant allegedly did here and are eager to punish him however we can.

This blog frequently addresses criminal cases in which the defendant clearly committed one or more serious crimes. In such cases, prosecutors regularly reach out for anything in the book to increase the sentence, increase their plea-bargaining leverage, and/or provide a fall-back charge. Not infrequently, they find a statute, or (as here) advance an interpretation of a statute, that could also apply to a significant swath of innocent conduct. I blog on these cases for three reasons: 1) such prosecutorial practices are a misuse of law and the justice system, in violation of the spirit (if not the letter) of the Double Jeopardy Clause; 2) criminal cases involving obvious "bad guys" are one of, if not the most common context in which courts consider potentially inflammatory sex-related topics, such as pornography and BDSM, and provide a window into judges' thinking (and prejudices) about these issues; and 3) the American experience with sodomy laws teaches us that the fact that a law is only ever used to prosecute truly culpable persons doesn't mean that it can't have other harmful effects.

Mass. lawmakers want to criminalize elder porn

A couple of geniuses in Massachusetts have proposed to extend that state's criminal child pornography to adults with disabilities and everyone over 60. I say it a lot here, and I'll say it again: No, really.

The Legal Satyricon has a fine post, so I won't belabor the point here:

Mass law defines an “elder” as anyone over the age of 60 (that includes Sylvester Stallone) and a “person with a disability as “a person with a permanent or long-term physical or mental impairment that prevents or restricts the individual’s ability to provide for his or her own care or protection.”

There are nightmare scenarios where people, due to mental infirmity, might not be able to give truly informed consent — and in those cases, I too would support measures to punish those who might exploit them. Illinois, for example, reportedly prohibits porn production involving the “severely mentally retarded.” Set aside the fact that we don’t call the mentally disabled “retarded” anymore, and such a law makes perfect sense. I am sure that, more likely than not, someone in such condition would lack the mental capacity to give their consent - and thus we should be jealously protective of their dignity and personal autonomy. C.f. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child pornography depicting actual children is not protected speech).

But, Reinstein’s law goes way too far.

Believe it or not, there is a market for “elder porn,” as well as “disability porn,” and those markets are served by consenting, healthy, elderly and disabled models. Naturally, some of this market caters to fetishists, but before you start saying “ewwww,” consider that there also happen to be many healthy members of society who don’t believe that sexual desirability ends at 60, nor at any other age, and it’s not just big in Japan. Just as “elderly,” is not necessarily inconsistent with “sexy,” (Sofia Loren and Sylvester Stallone are both over 60) neither is “physically disabled” necessarily inconsistent with “sexiness.” Just ask this wheelchair-bound porn actress.

One of the most utopian things about the internet is that anyone, and I mean anyone, can (no matter what they look like) find a porn site that features models that look just like them. ...

...Reinstein’s law is not limited to commercial porn. In fact, it doesn’t have to be porn at all - since I’d venture to guess that the elderly women who posed nude for this calendar don’t consider it to be “pornographic” or “perverted.”

The worst part is that Rep. Reinstein’s law equates nude photos of the elderly or disabled with child pornography: You can’t make it for any reason whatsoever, not even for private enjoyment, no exceptions, no nothing.

Presumably - hopefully - this one won't get far. If it does though, I suppose we'll see senior citizens arrested for taking their own boudoir pictures too.

Pa. federal judge blocks child porn charges for teens

Last week I blogged about the federal suit brought by teens and parents in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, against a local prosecutor who threatened the teens with felony child porn and sexual abuse charges for taking "provocative" photos of themselves on their cell phones.

The federal judge hearing the case has now issued a temporary restraining order (PDF), prohibiting the D.A. from bringing charges against these young women. The judge found it likely that they would prevail in proving that (1) the photos at issue did not violate any law, (2) the teens had a First Amendment right to refuse to participate in a five-week education and counseling program the D.A. sought to force them to attend, (3) the parents had a fundamental privacy right to refuse such a program for their children, and (4) the D.A. retaliated against the plaintiffs for refusing to participate in the program by threatening felony charges.

(A technical note: The judge also rejected the prosecutor's argument that he lacked the power to interfere with state prosecutions. The court explained that the federal "abstention" rule only prohibits federal courts from intervening in ongoing state prosecutions, not threats of prosecution. If the rule applied to threats of prosecution, after all, it could block a lot of pre-enforcement challenges to state laws that, e.g. abridge the freedom of speech.)

Va. court: upskirt photos are illegal peeping

I previously opined that existing invasion-of-privacy laws should suffice to address the problem of covert "upskirt" photography in public places, because even in public places an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" (as that term has traditionally been defined by courts) under her skirt. I'm pleased to report that the Virginia Court of Appeals agrees (PDF). H/t The Legal Satyricon.

Virginia has a law that was drafted with this kind of peeping in mind, but did not specifically address public places:

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally videotape, photograph, or film any nonconsenting person ... if (i) that person is totally nude, clad in undergarments, or in a state of undress so as to expose the genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female breast in a restroom, dressing room, locker room, hotel room, motel room, tanning bed, tanning booth, bedroom or other location; or (ii) the videotape, photograph, film or videographic or still image record is created by placing the lens or image-gathering component of the recording device in a position directly beneath or between a person’s legs for the purpose of capturing an image of the person’s intimate parts or undergarments covering those intimate parts when the intimate parts or undergarments would not otherwise be visible to the general public; and when the circumstances... are otherwise such that the person being videotaped, photographed, filmed or otherwise recorded would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court concluded that:

Under our construction of the statute, a person may, in fact, possess a reasonable expectation of privacy when being victimized in public...
The...requirement that the victim otherwise have a “reasonable expectation of privacy”... is made applicable to both clauses (i) and (ii). Accordingly, the victim’s reasonable expectation of privacy under clause (ii) is in reference to the victim’s intimate parts or undergarments covering those intimate parts—not in reference to the victim’s actual physical location (as in clause (i)).

The court's analysis is quite sensible, though I would note that it is based on the textual structure of this particular law. While this does help to reinforce its conclusion, I would have liked to see the court recognize that that this structural reinforcement is not necessary to reach the conclusion that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's beskirted undergarments. I have confidence, however, that courts would reach the same conclusion under a differently-worded statute, based entirely on this reasoning.

AVN reports on the case, and concludes:

The appeals opinion doesn't disclose what punishment Wilson actually got, but the case should serve as a warning to any adult [film] producer who still thinks this is a viable genre to get into.

By which they clearly mean "if you're really doing it with unconsenting subjects (which should have been obvious to begin with!)." Fake it all you want.

Reproductive rights news from Kansas

A Kansas grand jury has acquitted one of the nation's handful of late-term abortion providers of 19 charges of performing illegal abortions. State officials have been out to get the Wichita physician for some time now. These charges against George Tiller were pretty technical. Kansas law requires that a second physician sign off on late-term procedures. The prosecutor claimed that Tiller had an illegal financial connection to one of his second-opinion providers. The New York Times reports:

Dr. Tiller’s clinic is one of three in the United States that perform late-term abortions, and he has been reviled by anti-abortion forces for decades. In 1986, a bomb exploded on the roof of his clinic here, Women’s Health Care Services. In 1991, some 2,000 protesters were arrested outside during summer-long protests; in 1993, Dr. Tiller was shot in both arms by an anti-abortion activist while driving away from the clinic. Protests continue there almost daily....

The Rev. Patrick J. Mahoney, director of the Christian Defense Coalition in Washington, called the verdict “a setback.” Mr. Mahoney said that had jurors voted for conviction, “they would have put him out of business.” But Mr. Mahoney, who had predicted that the trial would “energize” anti-abortion forces, said it was a “very technical case” that was not relevant to other legal and legislative challenges to abortion.

Assistant Attorney General Barry Disney, who prosecuted Dr. Tiller, said the quick verdict probably resulted from the fact that the issue before jurors was clear and concise. “There wasn’t a lot for them to go back there and argue,” Mr. Disney said.

During testimony, both Dr. Tiller and Dr. Neuhaus, the only witness called by prosecutors, denied that there was anything improper about their financial relationship. Dr. Neuhaus testified that she misspoke during a 2006 deposition when she called herself a “full-time consultant” for Dr. Tiller.

The trial is not the end of Dr. Tiller’s legal problems. The state Board of Healing Arts is investigating a complaint that mirrors the accusations made in the trial.

Also in Kansas, Governor and Homeland Security Health & Human Services nominee Kathleen Sibelius has signed a law that will require that abortion clinics offer sonograms to patients. The Kansas City Star reports:

The new law also requires the state to make and distribute new pamphlets and a video about abortion and fetal development. And, it requires clinics to post signs telling patients that coerced abortions are illegal....

Last year Sebelius vetoed abortion legislation that included the sonogram provision but also went much further. That bill would have also required the state to collect more data on late-term abortions, given prosecutors more authority to access state abortion reports, and allowed relatives of women receiving late-term abortions to sue the provider if they suspected the abortion was illegal.

Sibelius is pro-choice, but hoped to avoid another showdown with an overwhelmingly antichoice legislature.

Exempting minors from child pornography laws?

Following up on yesterday's post:

Thomas MacAulay Millar, whose post on the Wyoming County, PA case over at Yes Means Yes! I linked yesterday, suggests adding the following exemption to the federal child pornography law (18 USC 2252):

(d) Notwithstanding the foregoing, no person shall have committed a criminal act within the meaning of this section solely by reason of having possessed, transported, shipped, or received a visual depiction wherein the person himself or herself is the only minor depicted.

This makes sense to me. It means that a minor would never be prosecuted for "child pornography" based on depictions of him- or herself. Any adult involved in the production or distribution of that material could still be liable, and minors could still be liable for material featuring other minors. But it would eliminate situations like this, reported Wednesday in New Jersey (h/t DailyKos):

CLIFTON — A 14-year-old girl faces child pornography charges after she allegedly posted nearly 30 nude pictures of herself on a social networking site, authorities said.

Detectives with the Passaic County Sheriff’s Department’s Internet Crimes Unit arrested the teen Tuesday. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children contacted sheriff’s detectives about someone posting photos of an underage nude girl on a MySpace profile. The center, which monitors social networking sites for illegal images of children, contacted county detectives through the State Police’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, said Bill Maer, the sheriff’s department spokesman.

Following a month-long investigation, detectives discovered that the person posting the pictures was the same person featured in them — the 14-year-old girl. Anyone who was “friends” with the girl through MySpace or knew her full name could have accessed the photos.

The teen was charged with one count of possession of child pornography and one count of distribution of child pornography. She was released into her mother’s custody, Maer said.

The teen reportedly told police she posted the pictures into a photo album for her boyfriend’s enjoyment. More arrests may be forthcoming, Maer said.

It's worth noting that while the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children initially flagged these photos for police, an NCMEC attorney recently criticized the practice of prosecuting minors in cases like this. As these prosecutions and threatened prosecutions continue to multiply, I think the case is building for building exemptions into child porn laws for cases like this. Fixing the federal law would just be a start, however, since to date I believe all the reported cases of this phenomenon have been at the state level.

Thomas's proposed exception wouldn't entirely solve the problem, as I see it; in a case like the Pennsylvania one, where three girls took pictures together, the minors could still be charged based on one another's participation. Putting aside that the material in that case was clearly legal, such a scenario, where multiple minors are each charged with victimizing one another, seems equally unwarranted. This would call for a more complex exemption - one that still allows for prosecutions of minors who are truly exploiting other minors - and how to draft it isn't immediately obvious to me. Additionally, if an exception is warranted for the child porn laws in multiple-minors situation like this, you'd presumably need to write a similar one into "sexual exploitation of a minor" statutes, since there's significant overlap between the two sets of laws.

This could be a sticky wicket, but the issue does need serious consideration. Prosecutions like this are to my mind unconscionable. As Thomas wrote yesterday:

Let me say this loud and clear: charging young women with sex offenses for distributing photographs of themselves is social control by intimidation. It ruins young women's lives to make an example of them, to keep others in line.

(As a side note: where did the media come up with the term "sexting"? It's catchy in a garish soundbite sort of way, but it makes no sense: it's meant to refer to sending pictures, not text.)

Spurious threat of prosecution used to shame teens

District Attorney George P. Skumanick of Wyoming County, PA isn't content to hop on the bandwagon of prosecuting teens for taking and sharing smutty pictures of themselves and one another under the child pornography laws. No, he's decided to use his legal muscle to put the fear of God (or more accurately, prison) in teens over material that is indisputably legal. Fortunately, these teens did the right thing: called the ACLU, who are helping the youngsters and their parents sue the local prosecutor.

Here's what happened, from the New York Times:

The picture that investigators from the office of District Attorney George P. Skumanick of Wyoming County had was taken two years earlier at a slumber party. It showed Marissa and a friend from the waist up. Both were wearing bras.

Mr. Skumanick said he considered the photo “provocative” enough to tell Marissa and the friend, Grace Kelly, that if they did not attend a 10-hour class dealing with pornography and sexual violence, he was considering filing a charge of sexual abuse of a minor against both girls. If convicted, they could serve time in prison and would probably have to register as sex offenders.

It was the same deal that 17 other students — 13 girls and 4 boys — accepted by the end of February. All of them either been caught with a cellphone containing pictures of nude or seminude students, or were identified in one or more such photos.

But three students, Marissa, Grace and a third girl who appeared in another photo, along with their mothers, felt the deal was unfair and illegal. On Wednesday, they filed a lawsuit in federal court in Scranton, Pa., against Mr. Skumanick.

They asked the court to stop the district attorney from filing charges against them, contending that his threat to do so was “retaliation” for the families asserting their First and Fourth Amendment rights to oppose his deal.

You go, girls. The ACLU of Pennsylvania's complaint (PDF) describes the content of the pictures:

One photo shows Marissa and Grace, from the waist up, lying side by side in their bras, with one talking on a telephone and the other making a peace sign. The other photo shows Nancy Doe standing upright, just emerged from the shower, with a white towel wrapped tightly around her body just below the breasts. The two photographs, which depict no sexual activity or display of pubic area, are not illegal under Pennsylvania’s crimes code and, indeed, are images protected by the First Amendment.

I've posted about this topic before, and there's an excellent, excellent post about it over at Yes Means Yes!, so I'll just say a few things about this case.

First off, let's note that Skumanick threatened not only child porn charges but also charges of sexual abuse of a minor. The relevant Pennsylvania law makes it a second-degree felony to "knowingly photograph... a child under the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act," including "nudity [that] is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction." Pa. Stat. Tit. 18 s 6312. The laws's plain language doesn't exempt minors from prosecution. But the plaintiffs have it right here: while the definition of nudity-for-the-purpose-of-sexual-stimulation is potentially broad, it clearly requires actual nudity, not just topless or underwear-clad pictures.

Second, for basically the same reason, it's patently clear that these girls' pictures wouldn't be "child pornography," but in fact would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Simply put, teens showing a little skin isn't a crime, or the Delia's people would be in big trouble. Indeed, the complaint alleges that:

The plaintiff minors will in the near future want to be photographed in their bathing suits, for instance during the summer when they go to a swimming pool or the beach, to which the respective parents have no objection. They are, however, chilled in their ability to take such photographs because of concern whether Skumanick will find them “provocative.”

Even baring your breasts doesn't make it "pornography," even if the local D.A. thinks it's "provocative."

No, this is a transparent case of a law enforcement official threatening prosecution for plainly legal, indeed constitutionally protected, material, in an attempt to shame and frighten kids away from ever engaging in such constitutionally-protected experimentation again.

Interestingly, the girls' mothers are suing on their own behalf too; the suit frames Skumanic's threats as a threat to parents' constitutional right to direct their children's upbringing and education by forcing them into "a re-education program wherein the girls must discuss why their conduct was wrong and what it means to be a girl."

Finally, it strikes me as more than a little suspicious that Skumanic's spate of prosecutorial threats targeted girls by a 4:1 margin. I doubt this merely reflected which local students were taking, posing in, or passing around racy pictures. More likely, girls were targeted because the main point of the exercise was to enforce traditional notions of female modesty.

Trans murder trial faces hurdle; media makes a sideshow of pronouns

A Colorado man is set to go on trial next month for the murder of 18-year-old Angie Zapata - though that trial is now facing a potentially serious snag after the judge ordered the defendant's confession thrown out because of overreaching by police. The local Greeley Tribune has covered the story extensively; the quality of their coverage has been mixed. (Compare this to a very professional and respectful profile of the case by ABC News.) Today they an unfortunately sensational article devoted to the use of pronouns in the case.

All of this is quite beside the point of this case, a tragedy shockingly similar to the murder of Gwen Araujo in California in 2002. But the issue is not without some news value, if not, as the paper's approach suggest, simply because it's "odd." As National Center for Transgender Equality director Mara Keisling hints in the article, the contestation of trans identities themselves is invariably a strong undercurrent in these cases, and here as elsewhere the defense has to some extent tried to dehumanize the victim by invalidating her identity. Even as the prosecution and defense are contesting the guilt of the accused, they are also, with each reference to the victim, contesting who she was. While the article suggests that the court may address this linguistic issue before trial, I expect this will not be the subject of any ruling; the lawyers will just keep using their contrasting language.

Unusually, the article makes a point of its own journalistic conventions by pointing out that the AP stylebook directs reporters to use language consistent with individuals' gender identity and expression. Many reporters don't know that this guidance exists or choose not to follow it, and I have periodically taken it upon myself to point it out in letters to the editor.

NYPD targeting gay men, pro Dommes

New York City police are being accused of targeting gay men for false and/or entrapment-based arrests for prostitution/solicitation in the city's sex shops. From The Advocate:

The Gay City News reports that at least 27 men were arrested for prostitution in eight porn shops in Manhattan in 2008. Since 2004 there have been 52 such arrests in eight difference businesses.

According to a statement by [Coalition to Stop the Arrests], the arrest is usually set up so that an attractive younger officer is sent out to approach middle-aged gay men. The officer allegedly entices the man to have sex. If the man agrees, the undercover officer says he wanted to pay the man for sexual favors, and then, before the man can accept or reject the transaction, he is surrounded by police to make an arrest.

Simultaneously, the city is being criticized for targeting the lawful work of professional dominatrices, twisting the prostitution laws to apply to non-sexually-explicit conduct. The only judicial decision on the subject, from 1994, held that NYC's prostitution law doesn't cover BDSM activities that don't involve actual genital contact. Yet in a recent meeting with reps from the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom, a prosecutor said that the city interprets the law expansively, based not on a limited set of acts but on "what is arousing to the participants." So, if spanking turns you on, paying someone to spank youis prostitution. This is questionable as a matter of the definition of "sexual conduct," not to mention policy and constitutional concerns. NCSF is currently planning a campaign to protest this policy.

I'm guessing from all this that NYC has finally run out of real crime to fight. Or maybe Bloomberg is hoping to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor and try to spin a reputation as The Man Who Ran Sex Out of NYC into a losing, but highly entertaining, presidential bid.

Slain Teen's Family "Sues Everybody For Not Destroying His Gayness"

Welcome Livejournal readers! You can follow Polymorphous Perversity through its LJ syndicated feed.

Headline courtesy of Joe.My.God, who has provided extensive coverage of the Lawrence King tragedy since the California student was murdered one year ago. Another high school student is currently facing trial for the murder, which has been charged as a hate crime and which shocked civil rights activists across the country.

In a suit filed last year, the King family claimed their son's school was at fault for failing to enforce its dress code. Their theory was that the teen's gender-nonconforming attire and makeup made him a target for violence. That's right: since they can't exactly blame the victim, their own son, they're doing the next best thing: blaming his gender expression, and the school authorities for failing to suppress it.

Here's my legal analysis: this is nonsense. Here's my more detailed legal analysis: 1) Schools have a duty to protect students from severe or violent anti-gay bullying. 2) Students have a First Amendment right to variant gender expression. 3) Schools have authority to limit student speech that may be "disruptive," but that authority is largely limited to speech that is disruptive in itself, and usually does not extend to speech that simply might inflame classmates' political loyalties or social prejudices. 4) More to the point, while the precise scope of schools' authority to limit controversial speech is debatable, a school's liability is another matter. The lawsuit essentially seeks to force schools to suppress expression of queer identities on pain of massive legal judgments. It frames student-on-student violence as an unavoidable result of queer expression, thereby blaming the victims of hate violence and implicitly absolving the school of any responsibility to protect students once they are targeted by bullies.

But this is what you'd expect from a family that threw their son out of the house for being queer: it's not homophobia that killed Lawrence King, it turns out, but queerness itself. And now the family has taken this broken logic even further by suing the youth shelter that took King in after they threw him out, for giving him women's clothing and makeup; and suing the Ventura County Rainbow Alliance, which hosted youth programs attended by the teen, for supposedly encouraging him to hit on his killer. They also sued a teacher and a counter social worker on similar grounds. So now their theory is that not only do schools have a responsibility to keep students safe by suppressing queer speech, but anyone who provides services to youth and fails to discourage queer expression is responsible for hate violence against them.

This would just be funny if it didn't reflect the way so many parents, and other people who work with youth, think: that queerness is an inherently dangerous behavior that kids stumble into and need to be protected from. In other words, guns don't kill people, being a faggot kills people.

(As a side note, it will be interesting to see whether social-conservative groups decide to highlight this case as an example of how liberals are perverting and endangering our kids, or will rightly recognize that the lawsuit itself, rather than the conduct of the defendants, is what will appall most people.)

For good measure, though, the King family did include a claim against King's murderer.

Protecting our children

Via Feministe: despite promises from Democrats, the proposed Omnibus Appropriations Act retains most funding for ineffective abstinence-only education. Click here to tell Congress to stop funding this nonsense.

Meanwhile: Waking Vixen asks why, when minors involved in prostitution are apparently being treated more leniently than adults, minors who produce their own amateur pornography are treated more hashly than adults. It seems the same concerns would apply to both situations involving possible coercion, later effects of the fact of involvement on the minor's life, and the possibility of feeding a market that promotes abuse of minors generally are applicable in both contexts.

WV's post is prompted bythe FBI's recent arrests in various cities of a large number of adult sex workers and their clients, which is being touted by the FBI as part of a campaign against child prostitution.

2257 upheld: swingers have no privacy interests?!

The full Sixth Circuit on Friday rejected a constitutional challenge to tough federal record-keeping requirements (PDF) for sexual imagery in print and online, on a partisan 11-6 vote.

A panel of the appeals court held the Section 2257 law unconstitutional in 2007. But in the ideologically polarized, conservative-dominated Sixth Circuit, a grant of en banc review almost invariably means a very conservative ruling – in this case, written by archconservative Jeffery Sutton. AVN has a quicky sketch of the case, which was brought by a small magazine that publishes explicit personal ads for swingers.

Some general observations:

The court considers 2257 to be a “content-neutral” law subject to “intermediate” scrutiny. This is because, although the law clearly is based on content, it is also aimed (ostensibly) not at content itself but at fighting child pornography. This part of the ruling is arguable but quite plausible; it gets worse from here.

Sutton is baldly derisive of the swingers who submit their pictures to the plaintiff publication and their interest in the privacy of their identities. “To the extent the advertisers are concerned that the law gives the government access to their names, addresses and other identifying information,” he writes, “they haveo more to complain about than every taxpayer in the country.” The difference being, of course, that IRS records – unless you're taking some very unusual deductions – generally don't attach your identity to your sexuality. Regardless, Sutton appears to believe that swingers don't actually have privacy interests, because:

Under § 2257, it is true, the government has access to these images and the identities of the individuals for the limited purpose of ensuring they are of age. But under Connection’s business model, so potentially does the rest of the world. The essence of the company’s service is to facilitate non-platonic connections between anonymous advertisers and anonymous subscribers, something it does by giving advertisers the opportunity to respond to inquiries they have solicited and by giving advertisers the opportunity to lift the veil of anonymity, to say nothing of other veils, to these unknown inquirers.

You've got to be kidding me. Because these people engage in casual sex, we assume that they have no sense of privacy whatsoever? That's what Judge Sutton seems to think; he goes on to say that maybe some of these people are more concerned about being outed to the feds than to other swingers, but there's just not enough evidence. This is a classic sexphobic move: sexually unconventional people, because they transgress certain normative sexual boundaries, are assumed to have no boundaries whatsoever.

In keeping with this sexphobic theme, the decision repeated relies on factual findings from the notorious and discredited 1986 Meese Commission on Pornography Report, for example to suggest that pornography almost invariably features very young adults and that there is a serious danger of minors ending up in what is marketed as adult pornography. Even if we take these findings at face value, they were made before the adult entertainment industry itself undertook strong and ongoing efforts to combat child pornography and keep minors out of porn.

Legally speaking, Sutton focuses on 2257 as an age-verification system, and largely ignores the burdensome how-when-where details that are at the heart of objections to the law. This may be because the plaintiffs focused on the argument that age verification shouldn't be necessary when material involved individuals who are clearly not young. Interestingly, though, even Judge Sutton admits that "the law would have difficulty withstanding an as-applied attack by a mature-adults-only magazine that included photographs only of readily identifiable mature adults." The decision also entertains the possibility that the law might be invalid as applied to private individuals producing material for their private enjoyment. In addition to these possibilities, the decision does seem to leave room for a variety of attacks on the devilish details of 2257.

On the other hand, the court holds that these aspects and applications of the law have to be challenged piecemeal -- that the law is not so clearly invalid in so many situations that it should be struck down altogether. And (contrary to the argument of at least one 2257 defender), the court agrees that 2257 does apply to the noncommercial material.

These points and others are covered in the four cogent dissenting opinions. I'll have more to say in another post about the court's questionable approach to questions of evidence, both regarding the impact of the law and the sexual expressions it affects, and how it is in tension with First Amendment principles and reflects the court's sexphobia.

Mass. Supremes: Boy can challenge gender bias in statutory rape charges

The highest court in Massachusetts held 3-2 [erroneously reported earlier as 5-2] that a teenage boy charged with statutory rape may force the government to turn over evidence that might help him claim gender bias. The case is essentially one about criminal procedure, and specifically what criminal defendants must show to be entitled to challenge their prosecution based on a claim of selective enforcement of any kind - but it also raises questions about who prosecutors decide to charge, and why, when underage youth have sex and all parties are apparently breaking the law.

The boy, 14, was charged with statutory rape involving three girls, all about age 12. He claims that he engaged in consensual oral and manual sex with each of the girls, and that the only apparent basis for choosing to prosecute him and not the girls was gender. The majority found that he was entitled to have the prosecutor turn over information that might prove that claim, specifically data about the gender of persons under 16 who were charged with statutory rape in the past. It was enough, at this stage, for the boy to point to the apparent discrepancy in his own case. The dissenters said that the age and grade differences here were plainly a legitimate basis for charging only the boy.

Edit: From the facts of the case this certainly doesn't look like the best test case to raise questions about gender bias. In addition to the age gap, there are facts in the court's opinion that suggest that at least one of the girls here may have felt pressured to engage in sex.

The case now goes back to the trial court for discovery, and the boy's lawyers will have to see if they can use the prosecutor's data to show a pattern of gender bias in statutory rape prosecutions.

H/t How Appealing. Press coverage of the case appears here and here.

Time for a new approach to human trafficking

Melissa Ditmore and Andrea Ritchie of the Urban Justice Center's Sex Workers Project have a great new post up at RH Reality Check. The post is based on the Project's new report: "Kicking Down the Door: The Use of Raids to Fight To Fight Trafficking in Persons":

We found that while there have been some successes, raids are generally an ineffective anti-trafficking tool, and in many cases are harmful to people who have been trafficked. Trafficked women reported that they were repeatedly arrested, in some cases up to ten times, in police raids on brothels and other sex work venues, without ever being identified as trafficked. ...

The Obama administration has the opportunity to reassess this failed federal approach to human trafficking. The recent passage of federal anti-trafficking legislation championed by Vice President Joe Biden offers a fresh start - and a chance to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

A good first step would be to move away from high-profile, resource-intensive and largely ineffective raids and to address the economic and social circumstances that increase vulnerability to trafficking....Expansion and targeted enforcement of labor laws in [sectors where trafficking flourishes] would not only go a long way toward locating, identifying and assisting trafficked persons, it would also protect the rights of all workers.

For the long term, strategies led by individuals and communities with knowledge of and access to trafficked people are far more likely than raids to meet with success....

Trafficking victims by definition have sought opportunity in the United States only to find themselves in coercive and abusive situations. We owe it to them to find better ways to locate, identify and assist them, and to develop anti-trafficking initiatives that prioritize their needs, choices, and self-determination as human beings. A good way to start would be to extend a helping hand that is not also holding a gun.

As I've noted in this blog before, the Sex Workers Project is doing some truly outstanding advocacy.

Another step the Obama administration could take would be to re-examine the equation of prostitution with trafficking under various provisions of federal law, including in restrictions on international aid. Some of these policies make providing life-saving services to sex workers more difficult, and distract from the serious problem of human trafficking.

Does an anti-porn documentary violate federal law? (cont'd)

Way back in November, I blogged about then-brewing blogtroversy over a new agitprop film, which argues that pornography is harmful to society. Particularly interesting to me was contention over whether the film, which contains copious excerpts from commercial porn films, violates the federal recordkeeping requirements for pornographers, known as Section 2257. I promised to take a close look at this legal question - but I didn't get around to it until now. Better late than never.

The basic duty. The core of the law, 18 USC 2257, is this:

Whoever produces any ...film [or other media] which contains one or more visual depictions ...of actual sexually explicit conduct...shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction.

Seems pretty straightforward. And the definition of "produce" in the law is very broad indeed. It includes:

digitizing an image, of a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct; or, assembling, manufacturing, publishing, duplicating, reproducing, or reissuing a book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, digital image, or picture, or other matter intended for commercial distribution, that contains a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct...

This clearly covers "secondary producers" who repackage content originally created by others - including documentary filmmakers. I therefore think it's reasonably clear that 2257's recordkeeping duties extend to the makers of a film like The Price of Pleasure.

"Fair use" does not apply to 2257. I have encountered three arguments to the effect that 2257 does not extend to this film. The first is that the film constitutes a "fair use" of the explicit images that is permitted by law. This is something of a non sequitir, since the "fair use" defense applies only to the law of intellectual property - as reflected by the fact that the film begins with a "Fair Use Notice" that references the US Copyright Act, and not 2257. It is fine so far as it goes - the makers of The Price of Pleasure should be safe from an infringement suit by the pornographers whose work they excerpt - but is irrelevant to 2257. Nor is there reason to expect that courts would impose a "fair use" exception to 2257 based on the First Amendment, since the fair use doctrine was developed to balance the competing interests that arise in IP disputes; the court has never referred to it in discussing the regulation of child pornography, which is the basis for 2257.

Is there an "obscured genitals" exception? A second argument is that 2257 does not apply because the documentary digitally obscures the naughty bits of performers in the various porn films it excerpts, thus rendering it no longer "sexually explicit." This argument has a superficial appeal, but doesn't seem to comport with the relevant statutory definition, which is:

“sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated—

(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;

(ii) bestiality;

(iii) masturbation;

(iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or

(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person;

18 USC 2256(2)(a). Notably, the law contains another, different definition of sexually explicit conduct that applies where minors are involved - and that definition specifically employs the word graphic, defined to mean that "a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any depicted person ...during any part of the time that the sexually explicit conduct is being depicted." This is a broad definition of graphic, but presumably would exclude consisent obscuring of the genitals. It is significant, therefore, that the term graphic is not employed in the definition that pertains to material not involving minors. I think it is relatively plain, therefore, that the term sexually explicit conduct (as applied to material involving only adults) includes depictions that are partially blurred. Sexual intercourse or masturbation is still sexual intercourse or masturbation.

But what if we concentrate not on sexually explicit conduct but on the term depicts? Is this conduct still being depicted if naughty bits are obscured? Neither the law nor any regulation defines depicts. Dictionary definitions of the term are somewhat circular: decpict means represent means portray means make a picture of means depict. It is at least arguable that depict is ambiguous as to whether it includes an obscured representation. But there are two reasons why I think it should :
(1) In common usage, I think we would say that a film does depict something even part of the thing being depicted is obscured, whether by shadow or by digital effects, where it is in fact a film of that thing and identifiable as such.
(2) If depict were defined more narrowly, it would make the use of the term graphic elsewhere in the statute largely, perhaps entirely, superfluous. One traditional rule of thumb is that a statute should not be interpreted in such a way that part of it is superfluous. If Congress used narrower language in one part of the law and not another, it clearly meant for them to be interpreted differently, and reading depict narrowly would seem to negate this.

Of couse, the fact that 2257 is a criminal statute, and the fact that it places restrictions on speech, are two factors suggesting that it should be generally be construed narrowly. And since I think 2257 is generally a flawed, overbroad statute, I would be happy for it to be interpreted as narrowly as possible. But I think it is fairly likely that 2257 does cover films with the naughty bits obscured - certainly likely enough it would be unwise not to try to comply.

Is there an educational exception? A final argument is that The Price of Pleasure is exempt because it is an educational film. This is based on the language of federal regulations, which state:

Sell, distribute, redistribute, and re-release refer to commercial distribution ...but does not refer to noncommercial or educational distribution of such matter, including transfers conducted by bona fide lending libraries, museums, schools, or educational organizations.

28 CFR Part 75(d).

At first glance, this might seem to create a broad exception for educational materials. But it doesn't, for a couple of reasons. Let's assume that the distributor of this film is in fact a "bona fide...educational organization" - it is in fact distributed by the Media Education Foundation, apparently an educational non-profit. And let's also assume that educational distribution here can include charging a fee, i.e., selling, while still falling into the exception - the "noncommercial or" would seem to suggest as much. That means the film is not covered by 2257(f)(4), which criminalizes the sale or distribution of covered material without a 2257 compliance notice (stating where age verification records are stored, etc.) And, let's assume that the regulation itself is reasonable and valid, even though a federal appeals court has stated that under the statute itself, "The plain text and definitions of the terms used admit of no commercial limitation on who will be considered producers." (This from a panel of the Sixth Circuit, which went on to hold 2257 unconstitutional in at least some sitautions. The decision has been vacated for rehearing by the full Sixth Circuit. For more on the case, see this article.)

So far, so good. But there is no textual basis for this regulatory exception to apply to 2257(f)(1) through (3), which make it a crime to produce covered material that later gets sold without including compliance notices and actually creating and maintaining accurate records. In other words, the exception seems to mean that the distributor, MEF, is in the clear - but it doesn't seem to be of any help to the filmmakers, who would still violate the law by failing to create and maintain records, and to include compliance notices.

Summing up. The above analysis is by no means exhaustive - this is a blog, not a law review - but I think it is enough to suggest that the producers of a film like this have serious reason to think they are required to comply with 2257. In other words, it's well within the CYA margin. If requiring documentary filmmakers to document the ages of performers in their source material seems impractical, even absurd - and to maintain an address where government officials can drop by anytime during business hours for the next several years to check those records - well, that's because 2257 is a badly written law. It takes the Mom-and-applie-pie premise of keeping minors out of pornography and takes it to absurd and, in some cases, likely unconstitutional lengths.